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Abstract. IPv6 is being deployed but many Internet Service Providers
have not implemented its support yet. Most of the end users have IPv6
ready computers but their network doesn’t support native IPv6 connec-
tion so they are forced to use transition mechanisms to transport IPv6
packets through IPv4 network. We do not know, what kind of traffic is
inside of these tunnels, which services are used and if the traffic does not
bypass security policy. This paper proposes an approach, how to moni-
tor IPv6 tunnels even on high-speed networks. The proposed approach
allows to monitor traffic on 10Gbps links, because it supports hardware-
accelerated packet distribution on multi-core processors. A system based
on the proposed approach is deployed at the CESNET2 network, which
is the largest academic network in the Czech Republic. This paper also
presents several statistics about tunneled traffic on the CESNET2 back-
bone links.
Keywords: IPv6, Teredo, ISATAP, 6to4, network monitoring, IPv6 tun-
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1 Introduction
End users have nowadays IPv6 ready computers, because support for this proto-
col is available in main operating systems (Windows, Linux, BSD, Mac OS X).
Unfortunately, not every ISP has implemented IPv6 support yet, which together
with IPv6 backward incompatibility with IPv4 protocol requires transition mech-
anisms. 6to4, Teredo and ISATAP are the most used transition techniques. These
three methods use encapsulation of IPv6 protocol inside IPv4 protocol – tun-
neling. The encapsulation hides the IPv6 traffic. Tunneled traffic may look like
ordinary IPv4 traffic using UDP ports, so administrators do not know, which
IPv6 network service is requested, how much traffic flows through tunnels etc.
IPv6 tunnels are created automatically so there is no need for a user interven-
tion. This can cause security problems such as bypassing firewalls, unauthorized
use of services etc.
We propose an approach how to overcome this limitation and how to monitor
tunneled IPv6 traffic. It features hardware-accelerated packet distribution with
which it is possible to monitor even 10Gbps links. Statistics and tunneled traffic
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distribution presented in this paper are generated from IPFIX data collected on
CESNET2 backbone links, which is the largest academic network in the Czech
Republic.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work. IPv6
transition techniques are described in Section 3. Proposal of architecture for
monitoring tunneled data is in Section 4. Section 5 shows several statistics and
analysis from network monitoring and Conclusion is in Section 6.
2 State-of-the-Art and Contribution
Several papers discuss and present IPv6 address and traffic analysis. Authors
in [4] analyze traffic from a US Tier-1 ISP. Analyzed traffic in their data-set
consists mainly of DNS and ICMP packets. They believe that it is because
ISP’s customers consider IPv6 traffic still as experimental. For IPv6 address
assignment they used methodology introduced in [5]. Statistics from a China
Tier-1 ISP are presented in [3]. Their observation about address assignment
and application usage are similar to ours with some exceptions. Their traffic
contains higher proportion of native IPv6 traffic. We believe, that it is due to
larger expansion of IPv6 in China and Asia.
Unfortunately analysis of tunneled IPv6 traffic is missing in many papers.
Some statistics are presented in [4] but just for Teredo traffic. Paper [6] observes
IPv6 traffic on 6to4 relay but it is quite old. Despite our best efforts we did
not find publications about tunneled IPv6 traffic in ISATAP tunnels. Statistics
about 6to4 tunnels or Teredo are not so detailed and up to date. This paper
tries to update knowledge about nowadays native and tunneled IPv6 traffic.
Contribution of this paper consists of several parts. First, we propose an
approach, how to extend IPFIX to provide possibility to monitor tunneled IPv6
traffic. This approach is scalable and can be used in very large networks for
monitoring IPv4, native IPv6 and tunneled IPv6 traffic. It is possible to use
our concept to collect traffic on high-speed 10Gbps links with no need to use
packet sampling. Second, we present several statistics for tunneling mechanisms.
Deployment of IPv6 protocol accelerates because new operating systems use
this protocol by default. Therefore more services are accessible through IPv6
protocol and traffic distribution is nowadays completely different than before.
Hence current statistics are very useful.
3 Transition Techniques
IPv6 connectivity is enabled and preferred in most operating systems by default.
If a station is connected to local IPv4 network without native IPv6 connectiv-
ity and web site or another network service is accessible through both protocols,
IPv6 has precedence and a host tries to communicate through this protocol first.
Because IPv6 is not compatible with the previous IPv4 protocol, different types
of transition techniques were proposed. The most interesting are tunneling tech-
niques, because we do not know, which protocols and services are used inside the
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tunnels. 6to4, Teredo and ISATAP are todays most used tunneling mechanisms
for connection to IPv6 network.
6to4 tunneling is the most used transition technique today. According to pri-
ority in operating system, if a network device has public IPv4 address, 6to4 is
the first mechanism to be used. A host construct 64 bits long IPv6 network
prefix according to rules described in [8]. Last 64 bits are used as EUI (End
Unit Identifier). Several techniques can be used to create the identifier: based on
EUI-64, manual assignment or randomly generated [2]. Default configuration in
Windows or Linux use well-known EUI values in practice. Linux use the value
1 by default and Windows XP, Vista, 7 use IPv4 address in lower 32 bits of the
EUI [12]. When sending packets, the 6to4 tunnel wraps an IPv6 datagram into
an IPv4 datagram with protocol number 41.
Teredo was designed to be able to send network traffic through NAT [7]. It does
not encapsulate IPv6 packet in protocol 41 but send it via UDP packet on default
port 3544. Teredo address is more complicated then 6to4 and consists of Teredo
prefix, Teredo server address, flags, port and client’s external address. When
simple encapsulation is used only the IPv6 packet is carried as the payload of an
UDP packet. Server may insert other fields such as Origin and Authentication.
ISATAP – Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol is an IPv6 tran-
sition mechanism used in local networks to connect islands of IPv6 nodes over
IPv4 networks. Connection to the Internet is made by another mechanism such
as 6to4. ISATAP like 6to4 uses encapsulation in protocol number 41 [9]. Nowa-
days ISATAP is usually the last used transition techniques. Transition techniques
order which a host tries when does not have native IPv6 connectivity is usually
6to4, Teredo, ISATAP.
4 Architecture and Implementation
The proposed approach for tunneled IPv6 traffic monitoring describes whole
process of IP flow generation, export and collection. The flows are generated by
FlowMon exporter a software probe which is able to export NetFlow and IPFIX
data. The FlowMon exporter is able to generate flow statistics from any source
if the input plug-in supports it [1].
4.1 Architecture
The proposed approach consist of three layers (see Figure 1). The first layer
can be a network card or a more specialized hardware. Purpose of this layer is
capturing packets and sending them over the software interface to the input plug-
in. We used the FPGA based COMBOv2 card and libsze2 library as a software
interface. We developed FPGA design for COMBOv2 cards HANIC (Hardware-
Accelerated Network Interface Card) which provides a high precision timestamp
generated for each packet. Packets can be distributed to several DMA (Direct
Memory Access) channels. Packet distribution is one of benefits of proposed
approach and is described in Section 4.2.
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Fig. 1. System architecture – packets are captured by the COMBOv2 card and can be
distributed to 16 FlowMon exporters with loaded input plug-in. IP flows are generated
based on processed packets and later exported in IPFIX format.
The second layer reads packets from the software interface and processes them
with the FlowMon exporter [1]. We designed and implemented input plug-in for
monitoring of IPv6 tunneled traffic but plug-ins can have any other functionality.
The plug-in for tunneled IPv6 traffic monitoring detects packets, which are
part of tunnels, using a defined set of rules. After tunnel is detected, IPv4 header
is stripped out and packets are processed by IPv6 header parser. Relevant infor-
mation from packet are stored to a data structure representing a part of flow (in
this case flow containing single packet). This filled data structure is passed to
the exporter. More about plug-in functionality can be found in Section 4.3. The
exporter generates flow statistics based on data structures from the input plug-
in. Flow statistics are exported in IPFIX using custom IPFIX templates with
enterprise-specific information elements to carry information about the tunnel.
The third and last layer is the IPFIX collector.
4.2 Packet Distribution
Packet distribution is implemented using the HANIC design. The goal is to
distribute packets between several instances of the FlowMon exporter on the
hardware level.
The HANIC design provides a packet header parser. The parser can extract
necessary fields for flow identification. The output of parsing unit is a sequence
of bits with fixed length of 301 bits. This sequence is then passed to the HASH
unit which computes CRC hash with length of log2(number of channels). Each
packet is send to one of channels according to its hash (the hash is used to
address a channel).
Current version of the design use hash length of four bits. This allows to
distribute packets to 16 instances of the FlowMon exporter without breaking
the flow cache. Another advantage is possibility to process packets on multiple
processors which greatly improves overall performance.
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4.3 Plug-in Implementation
The input plug-in is implemented as shared library for Linux. It filters and
preprocess each packet to data structure compatible with the FlowMon exporter
plug-in API. The input plug-in reads packets from the COMBOv2 card in a
form of memory chunks. These memory chunks consist of whole packet together
with high precision timestamp and card’s interface identifier from which packet
was read. Protocol number is extracted from Ethernet header or from the MPLS
label if MPLS is used.
All IPv4 packets are processed by the filters to detect presence of tunnel-
ing. Detection supports the following tunneling mechanisms: Teredo, 6to4 and
ISATAP. If Teredo encapsulation is found and encapsulated IPv6 address is in
format which is specified in [7], plug-in sets type of tunnel to indicate usage of
Teredo and pass filled data structure to exporter. Detection of ISATAP and 6to4
packets is similar as they share some characteristics. IPv4 protocol must be set
to value 41. In both mechanisms IPv4 header is followed by IPv6 header. To
decide if IPv6 packet is encapsulated by ISATAP or 6to4 plug-in checks IPv6
addresses and looks for address in format specified for 6to4 or ISATAP. Filled
data structure is passed to the FlowMon exporter.
4.4 Packet Processing Performance
Packet processing performance was measured as a throughput test when pro-
cessing packets from 10Gbps Ethernet link (see Figure 2). The measurement
run on 2.0GHz quad-core CPU and beside throughput we also monitored CPU
usage (see Figure 3). Throughput was measured for Teredo and 6to4 packets
(throughput of ISATAP packets is the same as throughput of 6to4 packets). In
first scenario all packets were processed by single instance of the FlowMon ex-
porter with loaded input plug-in. In the second scenario packets were distributed
to 4 instances of the FlowMon exporter with loaded input plug-in. Each instance
of the FlowMon exporter was running on different CPU core providing more
computing power for processing.
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To minimize impact of flow generation on performance results all packets in
the first scenario originated from single flow. In case of the second scenario four
different flows were used.
5 Monitoring of Real Network
We deployed monitoring system based on the proposed approach on the CES-
NET2 network. Three 10Gbps backbone links which are connecting the CES-
NET2 network to SANET (Slovak academic network), PIONIER (Polish optical
Internet) and NIX.CZ (Neutral Internet eXchange of not only Czech Republic)
networks were monitored. We were forced to slightly change the IPFIX templates
in way they shouldn’t be according to the IPFIX standard as we were using mod-
ified NfSen. NfSen doesn’t have full support for enterprise-specific elements [13].
The presented statistics are from September 24 to October 6, 2010.
5.1 IPv6 Address Assignment
Address assignment is a little bit different in IPv6 networks. Usually stateless
auto-configuration is used [11], so a host learns just network prefix and default
gateway. The lower part of IPv6 address (last 64 bits) is a host identifier and
can be assigned manually, based on EUI-64 algorithm or generated randomly
according [2]. We use similar methodology for address classification as in [5] but
some addresses are analyzed in detail.
Table 1 shows average number of unique IPv6 addresses in native, 6to4,
Teredo and ISATAP traffic per day. Surprisingly there is very high number of
Teredo addresses. Further examinations showed that Teredo is used mainly for
p2p sharing. We believe that it is because BitTorrent clients such as µTorrent
have implemented Teredo support, to be able to share data with more peers. We
detected several Teredo servers as well.
Native and 6to4 addresses are more analyzed and results are shown in Table 2
and Table 3. First table describes in detail 6to4 addresses in native and tunneled
traffic. Autoconf means, that EUI is generated according to EUI-64. Linux and
Windows rows describes, how many hosts use Windows and Linux/Unix oper-
ating systems. This detection is based on default values for the EUI fields [12].
Privacy means, that EUI is generated according to Privacy Extensions. The sec-
ond table shows address structure of global IPv6 address in native and tunneled
traffic.
5.2 Tunneled Traffic Characteristics
The first interesting fact about IPv6 tunneled traffic is, according to our mea-
surement, that it generates more traffic then native IPv6 traffic. This fact is
true for all of three metrics (by flow, by packets and by bytes) and is shown in
Table 4. As described earlier, the reason for this can be presence of tunneling
mechanisms in recent versions of MS Windows.
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Traffic Unique Addresses Note
Native IPv6 8059 (10.1%) details in Table 3
6to4 20090 (25.3%) details in Table 2
Teredo 51330 (64.5%) detected 13 Teredo servers
ISATAP 82 (0.1%)
Table 1. IPv6 unique addresses – average per day.
Native Tunneled Traffic
Autoconf 2.7% 1.4%
Linux 1.2% 0.3%
Windows 91.2% 85.6%
Privacy 4.9% 12.7%
Table 2. 6to4 addresses in detail.
Native Tunneled Traffic
Autoconf 9% 4.2%
Privacy 69.2% 69%
Low 21.8% 26.8%
Table 3. Global IPv6 addresses in detail.
Majority of IPv6 tunneled traffic uses Teredo mechanism (see Table 5). The
least used mechanism is ISATAP that may be given by the fact that it is the
least preferred option of tunneling in MS Windows.
Flows Packets Bytes
IPv4 98.39% 99.19% 99.13%
Native IPv6 0.10% 0.12% 0.21%
Tunneled IPv6 1.50% 0.69% 0.66%
Table 4. Traffic distribution.
Flows Packets Bytes
Teredo 88.18% 89.10% 88.85%
ISATAP 0.06% 0.03% 0.03%
6to4 11.76% 11.76% 11.12%
Table 5. Tunnel distribution.
We also observed very different distribution of application protocols in tun-
neled IPv6 traffic. The most used protocol in IPv4 and IPv6 traffic is HTTP. In
tunneled IPv6 traffic its share was very small and the traffic was overall spread
to hundreds of UDP and TCP ports with high numbers. We come to conclusion
that tunneled IPv6 especially Teredo is used for p2p sharing. Reasons, why p2p
programs use Teredo are described in Section 5.1.
Flows Packets Bytes
IPv4 IPv6 Tunnel IPv4 IPv6 Tunnel IPv4 IPv6 Tunnel
HTTP 38.25% 1.99% 0.35% 49.99% 65.50% 2.98% 56.80% 76.16% 0.38%
HTTPS 3.26% <0.01% 0.08% 1.72% <0.01% 2.85% 1.17% <0.01% 0.33%
DNS 10.39% 61.76% 0.45% 0.45% 1.68% 0.05% 0.07% 0.42% 0.01%
Table 6. Protocol distribution in tunneled and native traffic.
8 Martin Elich, Mateˇj Gre´gr, and Pavel Cˇeleda
6 Conclusion
Current flow-based traffic monitoring techniques can not easily analyze tun-
neled traffic. It is especially problem in IPv6 networks. In IPv6 networks tunnels
are created automatically, without users or administrators intervention. Because
IPv6 protocol is not compatible with current IPv4, these tunneling mechanisms
would be needed for several years. Network administrators will need an approach,
which is able to monitor tunneled traffic on high-speed networks, is scalable and
can be integrated into current monitoring systems. In this paper we propose such
an approach.
Monitoring 10Gbps links is possible using hardware-accelerated network
cards. We implemented a plug-in for the FlowMon exporter, which can mon-
itor tunneled IPv6 traffic and export obtained data using IPFIX. Collected data
can be further analyzed by IDS (Intrusion Detection System) and IPS (Intru-
sion Prevention System). Current monitoring software miss information about
the tunneled traffic. We propose an approach which is able to monitor this kind
of traffic. We successfully deployed the proposed solution on academic backbone
links in the Czech Republic.
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